Category: News

For years, it seems that the Serbian Government has operated under the assumption that  being almost aligned with EU criteria should be treated as meaningful progress. This mindset has  contributed not only to the slow pace of reforms but also to the reality that, after eleven years of  accession negotiations, Serbia has opened only two clusters. Under the EU Growth Plan, however,  the habit of presenting partial fulfilment as genuine reform is becoming a structural obstacle,  especially in the Reform Agenda’s area where reforms matter the most: Rule of Law and  Fundamental Rights.  

A striking example is the reform of the Unified Voter Register. The entire process – including the  audit – was supposed to be completed by December 2024. Instead, Serbia approaches the end of  2025 with the reform still only halfway implemented. The legal framework exists, and the  composition of the audit commission is progressing, but the core element, the audit itself, has not  even begun. The Reform Agenda indeed provides a two-year grace period, meaning Serbia can still receive the funds associated with this step. Yet the fact that a reform so central to electoral integrity  and democratic legitimacy has not been prioritised for an entire year raises a deeper concern: if  even this cannot be delivered on time, what does that say about the seriousness of the overall  reform effort?  

A similar pattern is visible in the area of anti-corruption. Serbia adopted a new Anti-Corruption Strategy in July 2024 and, at first glance, appeared to fulfil its obligation by adopting the  accompanying Action Plan in December of the same year. However, the Action Plan covers only  2024 and 2025, rather than the entire duration of the Strategy, despite the Reform Agenda explicitly  requiring a full implementation cycle. The result is a reform that is presented by the Government as  “completed,” but it is substantively partial. It illustrates how institutional energy is often invested  in satisfying the appearance of compliance rather than in establishing the foundations of effective  policy.  

The case of the REM Council further reinforces this pattern. In addition to being a formal obligation  under the Reform Agenda, Serbia also committed in December 2024 – through a non-paper  submitted to Member States – to urgently complete the election of the Council as part of a broader  effort to persuade Member States to support the opening of Cluster 3. A year later, eight of the nine 

members have been elected, leaving the Council still incomplete. The process has been repeatedly  interrupted, criticised by civil society, and burdened by procedural controversies. It is an  improvement, but it is also plainly insufficient. In the logic of the Growth Plan, partial reform is simply  not reform at all.  

The only exception within this framework applies to quantitative steps – those formulated as reaching  a specific number or percentage – which may be assessed as partially fulfilled and can therefore trigger  partial disbursement, proportional to the share of the quantitative target that has been achieved. But  qualitative reforms – and most rule-of-law obligations fall squarely into this category – cannot be  treated this way. They must be implemented fully, not approximately or substantially. This is not a  procedural detail; it is the core principle that separates reforms that exist on paper from reforms that  genuinely reshape institutions.  

This accumulation of “almost reforms” now appears to be complicating the European Commission’s  assessment process. Serbia submitted its first and second payment requests in March and July 2025,  yet no decision has been issued, well beyond the usual timeframe. Part of the delay likely reflects  the Commission’s attempt to distinguish what is genuinely fulfilled from what is merely presented  as such, requiring follow-up questions and clarifications from the Government. But the unusually  long period may also indicate a deeper review – one that goes beyond individual reform steps and  examines whether Serbia continues to meet the fundamental preconditions related to democratic  institutions, rule of law, and the normalisation of relations with Pristina.  

At this moment, Serbia faces a choice. Treating EU reforms as a checklist has produced diminishing  returns. What is needed now is not more drafting, nor more announcements, but clear political will  and institutional capacity to deliver reforms in full. Partial implementation cannot restore trust,  cannot unlock credibility, and cannot bring Serbia closer to the European Union. Only genuine,  complete reforms can do that.  

Almost done is not done. And almost-membership is still not membership. If Serbia is serious about  its European future, it must demonstrate that seriousness through reforms that are implemented  fully, not symbolically, and through institutions that function in practice, not only on paper. 

Author: Marko Todorović, European Policy Centre (CEP)

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